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ONCE IN JEROPARDY.
The maxim that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
life o- limb is as old in English law as Magna Charta itself.
It is a principle that comes to us from a time when cruel and
unusual punishments were conmmon. Cooley Const. Law 296-8,
This great fundamental principle of reason and justice is
deeply imbedded in the very foundations of the common law, as
one of its safeguards to protect human life.
If we reflect, that at the time this maxim came into exist-
ence almost every offense was punished ,with death or other
punishment touching the person, we can easily see the neces-
sity for its existence, at that time, and how carefully it
has since been guarded down to the present period.
We believe that the criminal jurisprudence of every civilized
country recognized and adopted a similar provision.
It certainly existed in English law, and Blackstone says:"It
is a universal maxim of the common law of England that no man
is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for
the same offense". Black. Com. 335.
The safeguard is broader in its application than as stated by
Blackstone, for the two kindred maxims of the common law.
Nemo debet vexari pro una et eadem causa and Nemo debetbis
puniri pro uno delecto, these two maxims have long guarded
the rights of successful litigants in civil, and prevented
oppression in criminal, cases, not only so far as life is
concerned, but also with respect to property, limb and liber-
ty . Brooms Legal Maxims 347-50.
We find a similar maxim in the civil law, non bis in idem,
which leads us to believe that the principle was at one time
universally recognized. Lactantius Inst. Div. bk 7 ch 8.
The English conmon law not only prohibited a second punish-
ment for the same offense, but it went further and forbade a
second trial for the same offense, and thii to whether the
accused had suffered punishments or not, and whether in the
former trial a person had been acquitted or convicted.
In England this maxim of the common law, is a matter of prac-
tice that has flucuated and varied at different times and
which cannot now be regarded to-day as finally settled.
Rex. v. Winsor L.R. 1 Q.B. 289.
It matters but little with us as to the history of this great
principle, as we adopt it as our unbending rule, and to which
the decisions of our courts must conform. This rijit is
glaranteed to the citizens of the United States by the U.S.
Const. Amend. Art. 5 and while this provision does not bind
the states, a question on which the authorities formerly dif-
fered, but which is now well settled: nearly all the Ameri-
can States have adopted similar provisions in their constitu-
tions, and even in those which do not have a similar provis-
ion, adopt and follow the principle as one fully establidhed
and settled at common law.
The question when a person on trial for a crime is first put
in jeopardy within the meaning of the constitutional guaran-
ty is one upon which there has been some diversity of judic-
-al opinion. In Teat v State 53 Miss. 453 Chalmers.J., deliv-
ering the opinion of the court, said: "There are few ques-
tions in criminal law upon which the authorities are more ir-
reconcilably at conflict than the one presented by these views
Without elaborating a question which has been so often and so
exhaustively discussed, we feel no hestation in announcing
our concurrence in that line of decisions which holds that a
person is placed in jeopardy, whenever, upon a valid indict-
ment, in a court of competent jurisdiction, and before a leg-
ally constituted jury, his trial has been fairly entered upom;
and that if thereafter the jury is illegally, improperly, and
unnecessarily discharged by the court, it operates as an ac-
quittal, so that he cannot thereafter be arraigned for the
same ofrenseg
Bishop says:"Without a jury, set apart and sworn for the par-
ticular case, the individual defendant has not been conduct-
ed to his period of jeopardy. But when according to the bet-
4ter opinion, the jury being full, is sworn, and added to the
other branches of the court, and all preliminary things of
record are ready for trial, the prisoner has reached the jeop-
ardy from the repetition of which our constitutional rule
protects him." Bishop Crim. Law I . 1015. These views are un-
doubtedly sustained by the great weight of american authority
Cooley Const. Lim. 327. Hines v State 24 Ohio St 134. King v
People 5 Hun 297 O'Brian v Com. 9 Bush 333. People v Cage 48
Cal. 323.Joy v State 14 Ind. 139. Adams v State 99 Ind. 244.
State v Redman 17 Iowa 323. Alexander v Com. 105 Pa. St. 1.
McFadden v Com. 23 Pa. St. 12. Whitmore v State 43 Ark. 271.
State v Davis 31 West Va. 390. State v Stewart 4 Pac. Rep. 12J
Grogan v State 44 Ala. 9. In re Spier 1 Dev. 491.
Another view is that jeopardy begins only after verdict.
People v Goodwin 18 Johns. 187. United States v Gilbert 2
Sumn. 19.
This is the view taken by the United States Supreme Court
and also of the courts of New York Texas. Miss. and some othes
United States v Perez 9 Wheaton 579. Taylor v State 35 Texas
97. Pizano v State 20 Texas App. 139. Brink v State 18 Texas
App. 344.
This view is strongly combatted by Bishop, who says: There
are a few cases in which it is laid iown, at least in dicta,
that the jeopardy begins only after verdict rendered. The
meaning of the constitution, it is said, is that no man shall
be twice tried for the same offense. But the adljudications,
even of these judges hardly sustain this proposition and the
difference between the danger, or jeopardy of a thing and
the thing itself, indicates the error on which these observa-
tions proceed. Indeed thus to substitute a word in the cons-
titution for the word in it, is to take with it great liber-
ties. Bishop Crim. Law I. 1018.
In the case of the People v Hunckler 48 Cal. 334. McKinstryJ.
says:"A defendant is placed in apparent jeopardy when he is
placed on trial before a competent court and a jury impanell-
ed and sworn. His jeopardy is real, unless it shqll appear
that a verdict could never have been rendered, by reason of
the death or illness of the judge, or a juryman, or that after
due deliberation the jury could not agree, or by reason of
some other like overruling necessity which compelled their
discharge without the consent of the defendant."
This is a clear and concise statement of the correct doctrine,
notwithstanding there are authorities to be found to the
cont-ar, both in the decisions of the courtl, and in the
text books on criminal law.
Former jeopardy is everywhere admitted to be a complete de-
fense, and being in jeopardy of an included offense constitu-
tes such a jeopardy, as is a bar to a prosecution on an in-
dictinent for the ejroater crime.
There are many different exrressiins by which courts state
the rule as to when jeopardly begins? and they differ only in
form of expression, their effect being the same. Thus jeop-
ardy begins whenever the jury has been sworn to try rhe cause.
Kingen v State 46 Ind. 132 When the accused has pleaded to
the indictment, and the jury sworn to try the cause. Com. v
Cook 6 Serg.& Rawle 577. State v Redman 17 Iowa 329.
When the case is submitted to the jury, and the case is sub-
mitted to the jury when the prisoner is arraignea, and the
plea entered.
Where one is put upon his trial upon a valid indictment, for
a eapita; offense. It may result in his condemnation, and
hence he is in jeopardy. Weinzorpflin v State 7 Black. 191.
Where the indictment is good, and the jury are charged with
the prisoner he is undoubtely in jeoa-lu dL'ing i delio-
eration. Whenever a person shall have been given in charge on
a legal indictment. Wright v State 5 Ind. 292.
In this country it may be generally said that the moment a
full jury is impanelled and all have been sworn, from that
moment his jeopardy contemplated by the constitution begins.
McFadden v Corn. 23 Pa.St.12.
But sorie judges have said that a person was not placed in
jeopardy until ther has been a verdict, and also a judg-
ment of the court upon it dictum of Washington.J., in U.S.v .
Haskell 4 Washington 402.
But the fact that after a jury is once impanelled and sworn,
even before verdict rendered, a prosecuting officer has no
right to enter a nolle prosequi, a principle now everywhere
admitted shows that a prisoner is in jeopardy before the jury
have been delivered of their verdict.
In determining this question whether or not a prisoner has
been in jeopardy so as to prevent his again being placed on
trial for the same offense it is highly important to ascer-
tain for what causes a jury may be legally discharged after
they have been sworn and charged with the deliverance of the
defendant. For if in a particular case the jeopardy has at-
tached, though for an instant only, and there is afterwards
such a lapse in the proceedings as requires a new jeopardy
in distinction from the old, to procure a conviction, the
defendant has thereby obtained the right to demand his dis-
charge: and neither can the proceedings be carried on against
further or new proceedings be instituted, because he cannot
brought twice in jeopardy.
Cooley Const. Lim. 326. Bishop Crim. Law I. 1016. O'Brian v
Com. 9 Bush 333.
In examining this subject we may group the cases into two
general classes. First where any separation cf the jury ex-
cept in case of absolute necessity, such as may be considered
the act of God is a bar to all subsequent proceedings.
Secondly where it is held that the discharge of the jury is
a matter of discretion for the court, and when rightfully
exercised it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.
The first group includes Pennsylvania, Tennessee, North Caro-
lina, and Indiana.
In Pennsylvania this question of jeopardy was brought before
the supreme court in 1822 in the case of Com. v. Cook 6 Serg.
& Rawle 577.It will be well to remember that the constitu-
tional provision of that State is exactly the same as that of
U.S. In this case the defendant pleaded a special plea that
the jury had been discharged on a former trial because they
were unable to agree, this was against the consent of the
defendant. The court held, that the discharge of a jury, be-
cause they were unable to agree was unlawful, Tilghman C.J.
admitted that in cases of absolute necessity the jury may be
discharged, but mere inabiliry to agree is not such necessi-
ty. If a person had been tried on an invalid indictment and
has been acquitted he may be tried again, because the court
could no have given judgment against him if he had been con-
victed. In 1831 4 case where the defendant interposed a sim-
ilar plea, the same court carried the doctrine of the above
case still further. Gibson C.J., argued that no discretionary
power whatever exists with the court to discharge a jury.
Why it should be thought that the citizen has no other assur-
ance than the arbitrary discretion of the magistrate, for the
enforcement of the constitutional principle that protects him
from being twice put in jeopardy of life or limb or member
for the same offense I am loss to imagine. If the discretion
is to be called in, there can be no remedy for the most pal-
pable abuse of it, but an interposition of the power to par-
don which ip obnoxious to the very same objection. Surely ev
every right secured by the constitution is guarded by sanc-
tions more imperative. But in those States where the principl
has no higher sanction than that derived from the common law,
it is nevertheless the birthright of the citizen and demand-
able as such. But a right which depends upon the will of the
magistrate is essentially no right at all: and for this rea-
son the common law abhors the exercise of a discretion in
matters that may be subjected to fixed and definite rules I
take it on grounds of reason as well as authority, then, that
a prisoner, of whom a jury have been discharged before ver-
diet iiven, may by pleading the circumstance in bar of anoth-
er trial, appeal from the order of thlr court before which he
stood, to the hilghest tribunal in the land, nor do I under-
stand how he shall be said not to have been in jeopardy be-
fore the jury have returned a verdict of acquittal. In the
legal as well as in the popular sense, he is in jeopardy the
instant he called to stand upon his defense: for from that
moment every movement of the comnonwealth is an attack on
his life:- and he not put out or jojoardy unless by verdict
of acquittal. If the prisoner has been illegally deprived of
his means of deliverance from jeopardy, every dictate of jus-
tice requires that he be placed on ground as favorable as
he could have possibly have attained by the most fortuate
determination of his chances. Com. v. Ciu 3 Rav±e 97.
In ti__' C3- 1 of' C m. v Fitz a.tricy, ±2-. Pa.St. 109. The prison-
er was indicted for murder, a trial waz had and the case sub-
mitted to the jury, the jury was unable to agree, and after
comeing into court repeatedly were discharged, against the
objection of the defendant. At the next term of court the
case was again called for trial, a special plea was interpos-
ed. The court held following the earlier cavethat the defend-
ant had been once placed in jeopardy and could not be tried
11.
ajain for the same offense. The supreme court of Tennessee in
Mahala v State 10 Yert. 532 fully adopted the rule of the
Pennsylvania cases. The defcndant wa3 on trial for murder,
and the jury retired to :eliberate about two o'clock P.M. they
came into court several times in the afternoon, declaring
they could not agree, but they were sent back, and kept to-
gether all night. About nine o'ocloek next morning, haiing
come into court, they informed the judge that it was impossi-
ble for them ever to agree, whereupon they were discharged
but such discharge was afterwards held erroneous. The reason-
ing of the cases in Pennsylvania say the court, is to our
mindz entirely satisfactory. If a moral impossibility, cons-
titutes a case of necessity, it is manifest that the decis-
ion of the zxx:k inferior court can never be reversed. How
san the superior court know whether the jury have agreed or
not, and how long shall the infer~or court be compelled to
keep the jury together, before it shall be warranted in say-
ing, that they cannot possibly agree? Shall it be an hour, a
week, or a month? Upon the whole, the power of discharging a
jury against the consent of the defendant, is of such a dan-
gereous character, that we hesitate not in saying that it
should not be exercised by the courts, when the jury cannot
agree on a verdict, unless they be prevented by a physical
12.
impossibility, and that when such impossibility does exist,
the jury should be kept together until the court is about to
adjourn, when of necessity they must be discharged.
The second group includes those States in which the dischar, e
of the jury, when it takes place in the exerciae of a sound
discretion is not a bar to a second trial.
This is the view taken by the United States Supreme Court
and of the Courts of New York Massachusetts and some others.
Said Washington Jo in a case where the jury, on a homicide
trial had been discharged in consequence of the alleged in-
sanity of one of them."That although the court may di*charge
in cases of misdemeanors, they have no such authority in cap-
itaX cases. We are clearly of the opinion that the jeopardy
spoken of in this article of the U.S. Const. can be interre-
ted to mean nothing short of the acquittal or conviction of
the prisoner, and the judgment of the court thereupon.
This was the meaning affixed to the expression by the common
law, notwithstanding some loose expressions to be found in
the decisions of some courts. United States v. Haskell 4
Washington 409.
In the eupreme Court of the United qtates this subject was
brought up in 1824., upon a certificate of division in the
13.
opinions of the judges of the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York.
The jury were discharged in the court below on account of
mere disagreement.
The question arises, whether the discharge of the jury by
the court from giving a verdict upon the indictment, with
which they were charged, without the consent of the prison-
er, is a bar to any future trial for the same offense#
If it be, then he is entitled to be discharged from custody:
if not then he ought to be held in imprisonment until such
trial can be had, we are of the opinion that the facts cons-
titute no legal bar to - further trial.The prisoner has not
been convicted or acquitted, and may again be put upon his
defense. We think in all cases of this nature, the law has
invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge
a jury from giving any verdict whenever, in theifopinion,
taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a
manifes necessity for the act, or the ends of justice
would be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion
on the subject: and it s ir.ossible to define all the cir-
cumstances, and for very plain obvious reasons and in capital
case courts should be especially cautious how they interfere
with any of the rights in favor of the prisoner. But after all
14.
they have the right to order the discharge: and the securi-
ty which the public have for the faithful sound, and conscien-
tious exercise of this discretion, rests in this as in other
cases, upon the responsbility of the judges und_r their
oaths of 2m: office.
We are aware that there is some diversity of opinion and prac-
tice on this subject, in the American Courts, but after weigh-
ing the question with due deliberation, we are of the opin-
ion that such a discharge constitutes no bar to a further
proceedings, and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner
from being again put on trial".
United States V. Perez 9 Wheaton 579.
-And while this case has been frequently cited and approved
as an authority, it certainly rests upon debatable ground,
as the facts show that the jury were discharged within half
an hour after they had retired to deliberate upon thdir ver-
diet. This particular case has been widely conmented on and
ariticised, and its authority has been weakened, if not en-
tirely overruled by the case of Ex partie Lang 18 Wallace 163.
In our own State of New YOrk a person is not placed in jeop-
ardy until a verdict has been rendered. This at least seeme to
be deducible from the authorities.
15.
In the case of The People v Goodwin 18 Johns. 187. The de-
fendant was indicted for manslaughter, the jury after a trial
of five days, and after, being kept together to consider of
their verdict for seventeen hours, declared that there was
no possibility of their agreeing on a verdict, and it being
within half an hour of the time when the court was bound to
close its session the jury were discharged, and the prisoner
again tried at another court.
Spencer C.J., says:"Upon full consideration I am of the opin-
ion that, although the puwer of discharging a jury is a deli-
cate andh highly important trust, yet, it does exist in
cases of' extreme and absolute necessity: and that it may be e
exercised without operating as an acquittal of the defendant:
that it extends ta well to felonies as misdemeanors, and
that itax±xkK exists and may be discreetly exercised in cases
where the jury, from the length of time they have been consid-
ering a cause, and their inability to agree, unless compelled
so to do from the pressing calls of famine or bodily exhaus-
tion, and in the present case, considering the great length
of time the jury had been out, that the period for which the
court could legally sit, was nearly terminated, and that it
was morally certain the jury could not agree before the
16.
court must adjourn, I think the exercise of the power was
discreet and legal. Much stress has been placed on the fact
that the defendant was in jeopardy during the time the jury
were deliberating. It is true that his situation was critic-
al and there was as, regards him danger, that the jury might
agree on a verdict of guilty, but in a legal sensen he was
not !n jeopardy, so that it would exonerate him from a second
trial. He has not been tried for the offense imputed to him,
to render the trial complete and perfect, there should have
been a verdict either for or against him. A literal observ-
ance of thi cases where by the visitation of God one of the
jurors should either die, or beco.' uterly unable to proceed
in the trial. It would extend, also to a case where the de-
fendant himself should be seized with a fit and become inca-
pable of attending to his defense: and it would extend to a
case where the jury were ..acessarily discharged in conse-
quence of the termination of the powers of the court.
In alegal sense therefore, a defendant is not put in jeopardy,
until the verdict of the jury is rendered for or against him,
and if for or against him, he can never be drawn in question
again for the same offense " .
In the case of Sheppard v people 25 N.Y. 406. Sheppard vT&s
indicted for arson in the first degree a trial was had, and
17.
the jury found him guilty of the offense. The court held that
a judgment having been rendered against the defendant that
was irregular that he could not be subjected to another trial
but should be discharged, and this though the defendant had
in a motion in arrest of judgment had asked for a new trial.
Sutherland J., says:"The circumstance, that the counsel of
the prisoner, on moving in arrest of judgment, also asked for
a ne-y trial, I regard of no consequence. The constitutional
provision is."No person shall he subject to be twrice put in
jeopardy for the same offense". New York Const. Art. I Sec.6.
This provision may be considered as addressed to courts: and,
if the prisoner is within its protection, he ought to be dis-
charged, although his counsel did formally ask for a new
trial".
Gardiner v People 6 Parker 155. Holds that a prisoner may
be tried on a second indictment after a nolle prosequi or
supersedeas of the first indictment, to which a plea to the
jurisdiction had been overruled, on the merits, and does not
place the defendant in jeopardy a second time.
People v Comstock 8 Wend. 549.
A new trial cannot be had where the prisoner has been acquit-
ted. Nor will a writ of error lie at the suit of the people
after judgment for the dofendant in a criminal c' se.
13.
People v Corning 2 M.Y. 9. But under the act of 1863 the judg
ment may be corrected.
Hu33y v People 47 Barb. 503. The prisoner by obtaining a noc.-T
trial waives his constitutional ri6Jit to the plea of once in
jeopardy and riay again be tried a second time for th.e same
offense.
People v Ruloff 5 Parker 77. Where* a person has been put on
trial, a juror cannot be withdrawn without his consent.
People v Barrett 2 Caines Cas. 304. Grant v People 4 Parker
527. Klock v People 2 Parker 676. An arrest of judgent after
conviction for felony is not abar to a second indictment..
People v Casbourns 13 Johns. 351. In cases of ,isdemeanor the
court may discharge the jury without the consent of the de-
fendant and he may be tried again for the same offanse.
People v Denton 2 Johns Cas. 275. A prisoner is not put in
jeopardy where the evidence fails to establish the offense
charged. Canter v People 1 Abb. Dec. 305.
A conviction for an assualt and battery is no bar to an in-
dictment for murder, where the assualted person subsequently
dies from the effect of the blows. Burns v People 1 Parker
182. In the case of Hartung v People 26 N.Y. 167 The defend-
ant was tried and convicted of murder, the law as it then ex-
19.
isted was changed and a new law enacted, governing the pun-
ishment of that crime. The court held, that the prisoner
could not be tried again, nor be executed under a re-enact-
ment of the old law. Denio C.J., said"The general rule as is
well known, is that if a person has been once tried and con-
victed or acquitted he may plead such prior acquittal or
conviction upon a subsequent arraig'nment for the same offense.
These would be good pleas at common law, and the constitu-
tien only affirms the principle and renders it unalterable
by any, exertion of the law making power. But it does not ap-
ply where the indictment was so defective, that no lawful
judgment could be rendered upon it, as in the case of a mis-
trial, as where there was no venire, or where the trial jury
did not consist of the full number of twelve jurors".
In this and other cases of the same nature it may be said
that the accused never was in legal jeopardy.
In the case of People v Palmer 109 N.Y. 413. The defendant
Palmer was indicted for assualt in the first degree, and
upon his trial convicted for assualt in the third degree, he
appealed from this judgment and obtainoL a reversal for errors
in the trial the court held that he should be tried again for
assualt in the first degree, and not simply of the lesser
20.
grade of which he had been convicted.
The provisions of our Code of Criminal Procedure Sections
333, 339 relating to pleas only contemplate a plea of 6uilty
or not guilty, or of former conviction or acquittal of the
offense charged, or of any matter of fact that tends to es-
tablih a defense of the crime charged, and with us the facts
of former jeopardy, where there has been no conviction or
acquittal should be given in evidence under a plea of not
guilty, as a matter tending to establish a defense.
Thus we see that it is everywhere admitted that there exists
causes for which a judge may discharge a jury, and thus com-
pell the defendant to submit to another trial.
This is contrary to the early English law, as there was at
one time an ancient tradition among English lawyers that a
jury once charged in a capital case could not be discharged
without rendering a verdict either for or against the prison-
er, even with the consent of the prisoner and the attorney
general. This rule is laid down and supported by so eminent
an authority as Lord Coke Coke's Inst. 110. 2276. We find
the same rule in Hale's Summary of the Ploas of the Crown.
In the case of the two Kinlocks which occured in the year
1746 and reported in Fosters Crown Law 16. Mr Justice Foster
21.
in delivering the opinion says: 1"'Ty Lord Coke w s one of those
learned men who gave into tradition, as far, at least as
concerneth capital cases; and he layeth down the rule in very
general terms, but he hath not given us any of the principles
of law or reason whereon he groundeth it".
And in this case above cited it was held that the court had
the authority to discharge a jury and thus subject the pris-
oner to another trial.
Thus we see that from an early date the courts possessed and
exercised the right to discharge a jury even in capital cases.
Among some of the causes in which it has been held proper
for courts to discharge a jury are the following: Sicknes of
the judge. Misconduct, sickness or incapacity of a juror.
Sickness of the prisoner. Incapacity of a witness4 Expiration
of the term of court. And the inability of a jury to agree.
As to cases of necessity for which a court may discharge a
jury there is no middle ground, the court must determine
when such a necessity has arisen as will warrant it in dis-
charging a jury either in a capital case, or in the case of
a misdemeanor,or the rule must be absolute, that after a jury
are once sworn and charged, no other jury, can be in anY
event sworn in the same case.
22.
The moment we admit cases of necessity to form exceptions,
that moment Ne open a door to the discretion of the court to
judge of that necessity, and to determine from the facts and
surrounding-s of each case what combination of circumstances
will create one.
We see from the cases cited in this a-ticle that all the
a:j.ree
authorities and cases that a p, erson can only once be placed
in, jeopardy the only dispute being as to when that jeop-
ardy is full and complete so as to be taken advantage of by
the defendant*
We feel no hestation in adopting the rule of the cases in
Pennsylvania and Tennessee as being the one that is based on
authority as well as reason, and which is consistent not
only with our American form of government, but also as carry-
ing out the ends of justice.
Owen L. Potter.

